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During the expansion prior to the crisis, against an international background marked by 
low interest rates, optimistic expectations about economic growth and underpriced risks, 
the debt levels of households and non-financial corporations in the advanced economies 
increased markedly. In Spain this phenomenon became notably acute and debt ratios 
higher than those observed in peer countries were recorded (see Chart 2.1). EMU 
membership prompted an upward revision of expected incomes and set in place very 
loose financing conditions, the expansionary impulses of which on lending were not 
sufficiently countered by other economic policies. With the onset of the crisis, whose 
recessionary effects were sharper in Spain than in other countries owing – among other 
causes – to burgeoning private debt, the value of household and corporate wealth and 
future income expectations were revised downwards. Under these conditions, lowering 
the debt ratios of the non-financial private sector became a necessity. While these ratios 
have fallen from their mid-2010 peaks, they are still higher than in the past and exceed 
those of other developed economies.
At the start of the crisis, public debt was nevertheless low, from both an historical and 
international standpoint; but during the crisis, budget deficits and general government 
debt rose swiftly. At end-2013, the public debt/GDP ratio stood at 93.9%, far exceeding 
the 60% benchmark set under the Maastricht Treaty and slightly above the average euro 
area level (see Chart 2.1). 
The increase in public and private debt, which has not been accompanied by a comparable 
rise in the financial assets of these sectors, has translated into a towering figure for the 
nation’s net debt vis-à-vis the rest of the world: 98% of GDP at end-2013, a figure 
substantially higher than that of other advanced economies (see Chart 2.1). This high 
dependence on external saving is a considerable factor of vulnerability, as highlighted 
during the collapse in the financing of the balance of payments in summer 2012.
Debt, along with saving, is the instrument economic agents use to optimise their 
expenditure time profiles without being constrained by the distribution of their income over 
time. Thus, for example, in the initial stages of their life cycle, households usually incur 
higher expenses relative to their income than in later stages, meaning that debt levels are 
relatively higher among younger households. Likewise, companies resort in the short term 
to external funds to finance investment projects that generate earnings in the medium and 
long term, and general government uses debt so that the profile of public spending is less 
volatile over the course of the business cycle than that of revenue, which is highly sensitive 
to economic fluctuations. 
Given that debt enables borrowers either to attain the expenditure time profile they wish or 
to undertake profitable investment projects, the resort to debt helps increase social well-
being. At the same time, however, debt increases their vulnerability to unforeseen shocks 
that constrain current or expected revenue, reduce wealth and worsen financing conditions. 
The readjustment of consumption and investment plans prompted by these adverse 
changes will tend to be greater the higher the accumulated debt. In turn, the perception by 
lenders that borrowers’ level of debt may be excessive raises the cost of new loans and 
diminishes loan availability, which likewise restricts the possibilities of expanding 
expenditure. In a situation such as that prevailing at present in the Spanish economy, this 
1  Introduction
Private-sector debt in Spain 
reached high levels before
the onset of the crisis...
... while public-sector debt 
rose swiftly during the crisis 
As a result of high private and 
public debt, the economy
as a whole shows a swollen 
external debt 
The resort to debt allows 
expenditure time profiles
to be attained that are not 
constrained by the distribution 
over time of revenue...
... but high debt levels 
increase borrowers’ financial 
vulnerability, amplify the 
economic effects of adverse 
shocks and bear down on 
economic recovery after
a crisis 
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restriction weighs down significantly on growth and its correction is unavoidable if a path 
of recovery is to firm. 
Diagnosing situations of excess debt for a specific sector, whether public or private, is no 
easy task, since its optimum level depends on future paths of financing costs and revenues, 
which are highly uncertain and complex to estimate. Moreover, the conditions of indebted 
agents within each sector are usually considerably mixed. That means the analysis cannot 
confine itself solely to aggregate data and to historical and international comparisons of 
such figures, but that it must also delve into the informational wealth of microeconomic 
data. As a result, the estimates available in the economic literature on the thresholds 
beyond which leverage causes negative effects on economic growth1 must be viewed with 
due caution. Indeed, a specific level of debt of, for instance, non-financial corporations as 
a whole may have very different consequences for growth depending on what its 
distribution is. 
To analyse debt in a sector,
its particularities and the 
heterogeneity of the agents 
comprising it must be taken 
into account...
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SOURCES: ECB, OECD, European Commission, national sources and Banco de España.
a Debt includes loans and ?xed-income securities.  
b For EU countries according to the Excessive De?cit Procedure.
c For Italy, the ?gure is for 1997; for the United States and the euro area, for 1999. 
1  On the existence of debt thresholds beyond which economic growth declines, see C. Reinhart and K. Rogoff 
(2010), “Growth in a Time of Debt”, American Economic Review, 100 (2), pp. 573-578; S. Cechetti, M. S. Mohanty 
and F. Zampolli (2011), The real effects of debt, Bis working paper 352; and U. Panizza and A. F. Presbitero 
(2013), “Public Debt and Economic Growth in Advanced Economies: A Survey”, Swiss Journal of Economics and 
Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 149 (II), pp. 175-204.
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A relatively standard way of identifying possible situations of excess debt is through debt 
sustainability analysis where, essentially, the conditions needed for liabilities to stabilise in 
relation to borrowers’ ability to pay are characterised. This approach is of some use in the 
case of the public sector, but its application to households and non-financial corporations 
is more complex, since these sectors are made up of a much higher number of 
heterogeneous agents. 
Nor can an analysis of the debt of each of the economy’s institutional sectors ignore the 
fact that the position of each sector can affect the rest through different transmission 
channels that operate both through quantities (e.g. a reduction in consumption and in 
investment to amortise private debts may adversely impact economic activity and, 
therefore, general government revenue and expenditure) and through costs (e.g. through 
the pass-through of the sovereign risk premium to the credit premia paid by the private 
sector). Accordingly, the view offered by an itemised analysis of the sectors should be 
complemented by a broader overview of the nation’s aggregate debt. 
From this perspective, this chapter primarily characterises households’ and non-financial 
corporations’ debt and assesses progress in its adjustment. It then analyses how the 
financial position of these sectors has, along with financial-sector and general government 
measures, shaped aggregate debt in the Spanish economy. Finally, it discusses the 
challenges posed in squaring the necessary reduction of private and public debt with the 
ongoing adjustment and the restoring of sustained growth in the medium term for the 
Spanish economy.2
From 1995 to 2007, credit raised by Spanish households increased at an annual average 
rate of 17%, compared with an average increase in nominal GDP of 7.5% (see Chart 2.2). 
This strong growth in their debt is due to a combination of several factors. First, the 
comfortable financing conditions – prompted by the context of financial innovation and lax 
credit standards at the international level, by the convergence of Spanish and euro area 
interest rates, and by the continuation of an expansionary monetary policy – provided for 
access to credit at a lower cost. In parallel, greater macroeconomic stability and the 
favourable growth expectations associated with EMU entry led lenders and borrowers to 
underestimate the risks of debt. Lastly, the high demand for housing, fuelled by 
demographic and institutional factors as well as the two foregoing elements, led to a real 
estate boom which increased the expected value of real assets and which, in turn, 
facilitated indebtedness since the assets in question acted as collateral for the loans 
received. 
The effects of these three factors were, moreover, mutually reinforcing: the increase in 
lending boosted spending, which in turn raised economic growth and asset prices, 
stimulating high demand for credit and ready access to it via the rise in the value of the 
assets that could be used as collateral. 
This interaction between the demand for credit and asset prices was particularly intense in 
the real estate market.3 Most household debt was thus assigned to house purchases, 
meaning that the weight of this type of lending rose from 56% of the sector’s liabilities in 
... as must interrelatedness 
with the other sectors
in the economy 
This chapter analyses the 
Spanish economy’s debt, 
assesses the progress in its 
correction and discusses
the challenges it poses 
2  Private-sector debt in 
the Spanish economy
2.1 HOUSEHOLD DEBT 
Household debt grew at a very 
sharp pace before the crisis 
Most debt was assigned
to purchasing real estate 
assets 
2  The role of fiscal policy in the growth of public debt during the crisis and the analysis of its sustainability were 
addressed in Chapter 2 of the 2010 Annual Report.
3  For an empirical analysis of the relationship between house prices and real estate lending in Spain, see R. 
Gimeno and C. Martínez Carrascal (2010), “The relationship between house prices and loans for house purchase. 
The Spanish case”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 34, pp. 1849-1855.
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SOURCES: Banco de España and Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey.
a Includes securitised credits and loans transferred to Sareb.
b As a proportion of total persons aged over 16.
c Average debt of persons with outstanding loans.
d Average secured debt of persons with this type of loan.
e Average unsecured debt of persons with this type of loan.
f For Spain, the data refer to 2011. For the euro area, the reference year is 2010 for most countries.
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1995 to 75% in 2007. Consumer credit and other lending increased at a slower pace, but 
also expanded notably (posting annual average growth of 11%).
As a result of these developments, household debt as a percentage of GDP, which stood 
in 1995 at 31% (a low level compared with other advanced countries), climbed to 83% in 
2007. This figure exceeded the average for the euro area, though not that observed in the 
United States and the United Kingdom (see Chart 2.1). In terms of gross disposable 
income (GDI), the increase was likewise notable, rising from 45% to 131%. Debt relative to 
GDI peaked in 2008 but, in terms of GDP, it continued increasing during the initial years of 
the crisis owing to the negative trend of output, peaking in 2010. Both ratios have since 
tended to fall slowly, while remaining above the average figure for the euro area, and the 
debt/GDI ratio has reached a level higher than that of the United States. 
According to Central Credit Register (CCR) figures, the increase in household debt during 
the expansion prior to the crisis reflects both the rise in the proportion of households in 
debt (up from 15% in 1995 to 40% in 2007) and the increase in the average debt borne 
by each household (which rose, in nominal terms, from €20,000 to €52,000 over this same 
period). The Spanish Survey of Household Finances (EFF by its Spanish acronym) – which 
provides much more detailed information on the socio-economic characteristics of 
indebted households but which is only available every three years, from 2002 – 
corroborates this. According to this source, the percentage of households with some 
form of debt increased from 43.6% in 2002 to 50% in 2008, while the median of this debt, 
in constant 2011 terms, rose from €28,000 to €38,700 over the same period. The latest 
edition of the EFF, which refers to the end-2011 situation, evidences the slight decline in 
the proportion of indebted households, while median debt shows an additional increase 
of 11% which, nonetheless, is fully determined by the behaviour of debt tied to house 
purchase.4
As might be expected, the EFF also shows that the proportion of indebted households 
grows commensurately with level of income (22% in the first quintile of the distribution and 
65% in the last) and declines in step with the age of the household head (higher than 70% 
in the age bracket below 44). The median debt/income ratio is higher in the lower-income 
segments (around 330% for the first quintile of the distribution) and for households whose 
head is younger (around 300% for the under-35 segment).5
Compared with the euro area, the proportion of indebted households was, at the end of 
the current decade, somewhat higher in Spain owing to the greater weight of lending for 
house purchases in our country.6 The greater incidence of mortgage loans in Spain also 
explains why the debt/income ratio of the representative indebted household is higher, 
given that the amounts of the loans for property purchases are usually higher and that 
the loan-to-value ratio for these assets is, nevertheless, less than in the euro area 
(although this difference has narrowed recently as a result of the decline in house prices 
in Spain). 
The debt/income ratio stands 
above the average level
for the euro area
and the United States
The increase in debt was
the outcome both of a higher 
proportion of households with 
loans and of an increase in 
debt per indebted household
There is high heterogeneity 
across the debt ratios of the 
different population groups ...
... but they are higher in Spain 
than in the euro area for most 
of the debtor segments 
4  In the remaining components there was, in fact, a contraction. See “Survey of Household Finances (EFF) 2011: 
methods, results and changes since 2008”, Economic Bulletin, January 2014, Banco de España. The figures for 
median debt are expressed in 2011 euro.
5  These data refer to 2011.
6  The euro area data are based on the Eurosystem household finance and consumption survey, which contains 
similar information to that of the EFF for 15 euro area countries, and whose first edition referred to the start of the 
current decade. For further details on the comparison with the euro area, see M. A. Marchetti and C. Martínez 
Carrascal (2013), “Un análisis del endeudamiento de las familias a partir de la encuesta del Eurosistema sobre la 
situación financiera y el consumo de los hogares de 2010”, Boletín Económico, December, Banco de España.
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The segment of households subject to most financial pressure in the short term, 
understood as those whose debt burden associated with debt payments exceeds 40% 
of their income, is also higher in Spain (6.5%) than in the euro area (3.4%). This 
percentage grew uninterruptedly from 2002 to 2008 (see Chart 2.3), but fell in 2011 (the 
latest available wave of the EFF) thanks to the lowering of interest rates during the 
crisis. By population group, lower-income, lower-wealth households with outstanding 
debts and those whose household head is young are those that most frequently face 
higher financial pressure. 
The indicators generally used to approximate the proportion of households subject to 
greater financial pressure more into the medium term (a debt/income ratio above 3 and a 
debt/wealth ratio over 75%) evidence a continuation of the growing path prior to the 
crisis. In the first place, the percentage (13.2%) is also higher than that observed in the 
euro area, while in the second instance (8.1%) it is similar. As occurs with the short-term 
indicator, the percentage of indebted households facing greater financial pressure in the 
medium term is higher among lower-income, lower-wealth households and in those in 
which the household head is young. 
Over the past five years there has been a positive relationship in the advanced economies 
between the increase in household debt in the run-up to the crisis and the intensity of the 
The household segment 
subject to most financial 
pressure in the short term also 
accounts for a higher 
percentage in Spain than in the 
euro area, although this figure 
has recently fallen somewhat
The high level of household 
debt has intensified the 
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crisis, through the effect exerted by debt on the reduction in consumption (durable goods 
in particular).7 This effect can operate through three channels. First, through a wealth effect, 
which leads consumption to vary in the face of changes in household net wealth. Debt 
enables a higher volume of assets to be acquired and, therefore, raises household exposure 
to declines in the value of such assets, as was the case during the crisis. Moreover, debt 
levels exert a greater constraint on access to credit, which raises the proportion of 
households subject to liquidity restrictions and, therefore, with less spending capacity. 
Finally, greater uncertainty prompts an increase in precautionary saving, which reduces 
consumption. This increase in uncertainty is probably greater for households that are more 
indebted and, therefore, more exposed to the shocks that usually accompany a crisis.8
There is empirical evidence in Spain on how important these channels were in the unfolding 
of the crisis. Studies conducted drawing on the EFF reveal, first, that the wealth effect is 
relatively small in our economy: given a decline in (net real estate) wealth of €100, 
consumption falls by only €1 (€0.4 in the case of durable goods).9 However, according to 
the same source, the percentage of households reporting saving for “emergency reasons”, 
which may be considered as an indicator of the trend of precautionary saving, increased 
from 11.6% in 2005 to 19.1% in 2011, and the increase was substantially greater (12.5 pp) 
in the quintile of the most indebted households (see Table 2.1). 
As regards the role of liquidity constraints, the percentage of households applying for a 
bank loan fell from 27.1% in 2005 to 17.7% in 2011. The decline was greater among 
households with some type of debt (by almost 20 pp) than among those with none; and, 
among the former it was higher for those in the upper quintile of the distribution of the debt/
income ratio (in this latter case the reduction was almost 30 pp) (see Table 2.2). Partly, this 
shows that households in that quintile were also those that reported having increased to a 
greater extent their propensity for emergency saving (and, by saving more, they would 
cease to resort to credit). Nonetheless, the proportion of households that did not apply for 
a loan because they thought it would not be granted also increased more in this quintile, 
suggesting that their debt restricted their capacity to gain access to new credit. 
During the expansionary phase prior to the crisis, non-financial corporations’ debt also 
increased at a very high rate (15% in annual average terms, from 1995 to 2007). As in the 
case of households, this expansion in debt was driven by very loose financing conditions 
and by optimistic expectations about the return on investments. The phenomenon was 
particularly intense in certain sectors of activity, particularly those linked to the real estate 
contraction in consumption 
during the crisis 
2.2  NON-FINANCIAL 
CORPORATIONS’ DEBT 
Non-financial corporations’ 
debt reached very high 
levels...
7  It has been estimated with international data that, for each 10 pp increase in household debt prior to the crisis, 
consumption fell by 2.6 pp [see IMF (2012), “Dealing with Household Debt”, chapter 3, World Economic Outlook, 
Spring]. In the United States, most of the decline in GDP during the 2007-2009 recession was due to the 
reduction in household consumption (durable goods in particular), which was much sharper in those areas in 
which households were more indebted [see A. Mian and A. Sufi (2010), “Household Leverage and the Recession 
of 2007 to 2009”, IMF Economic Review, 58 (1), pp. 74-117, and Th. Philippon and V. Midrigan (2011), Household 
Leverage and the Recession, NBER working paper 16965].
8  See K. Dynan (2012), Is a Household Debt Overhang Holding Back Consumption?, Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, Spring, pp. 299-362; T. Jappelli and L. Pistaferri (2013), Fiscal Policy and MPC Heterogeneity, CEPR Discussion 
Paper 9333; and Á. Estrada, D. Garrote, E. Valdeolivas and J. Vallés (2014), Household Debt and Uncertainty: Private 
Consumption after the Great Recession, Documento de Trabajo del Banco de España, forthcoming.
9  See O. Bover (2005), Wealth effects on consumption: Microeconometric estimates from the Spanish Survey of 
Household Finances, Documentos de Trabajo, no. 0522, Banco de España, and C. Barceló and E. Villanueva 
(2010), The response of household wealth to the risk of losing the job: evidence from differences in firing costs, 
Documentos de Trabajo, no. 1002, Banco de España. The estimates of the wealth effect in relation to spending 
on durable consumption are taken from a panel survey of Spanish municipalities for which spending on cars from 
2007 to 2012 is related to the changes in real estate wealth recorded in these municipalities [see D. López-
Rodríguez and F. Elías (2014), Mortgage Lending Cycles with Heterogeneous Credit Quality: Evidence from the 
Spanish Housing Boom and Bust, Documento de Trabajo del Banco de España, forthcoming].
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Application
Applications 
rejected as a 
% of 
applications 
made
Application
Applications 
rejected as a 
% of 
applications 
made
Application
Applications 
rejected as a 
% of 
applications 
made
Total 
households 27.1 12.0 22.9 12.4 17.7 23.2
Ownership, without mortgage 19.6 11.5 16.2 7.4 12.2 17.6
Ownership, with mortgage 43.4 10.2 36.6 14.6 26.8 21.4
Other 26.5 17.0 24.3 18.2 21.8 37.3
Below 25th percentile 23.1 18.2 19.8 18.1 18.4 37.1
Between 25th and 50th percentile 29.5 11.0 24.6 12.8 18.4 23.5
Between 50th and 75th percentile 27.5 12.7 22.0 13.8 15.8 22.8
Between 75th and 90th percentile 25.5 8.0 25.3 5.1 18.5 7.6
Between 90th and 100th percentile 31.4 3.6 25.4 7.3 17.5 11.3
Below 20th percentile 48.0 11.0 38.8 10.2 30.1 23.4
Between 20th and 40th percentile 53.6 10.2 41.9 9.1 38.1 17.5
Between 40th and 60th percentile 45.7 8.3 43.8 3.4 31.5 18.4
Between 60th and 80th percentile 54.8 7.0 41.0 7.2 35.1 16.8
Between 80th and 100th percentile 66.6 15.0 59.5 19.8 36.9 24.2
2005 2008 2011
Real estate 
wealth
Occupancy 
status of main 
residence
Debt/income
(indebted 
households)
LOAN APPLICATIONS AND LOANS REJECTED OR GRANTED FOR A LOWER AMOUNT IN THE PAST TWO YEARS TABLE 2.2 
SOURCES: Spanish Survey of Household Finances (EFF), Banco de España (EFF2005, EFF2008, EFF2011). 
% of total households
2005 2008 2011
Total households 11.6 16.4 19.1
Ownership, without mortgage 13.2 16.7 19.8
Ownership, with mortgage 11.6 17.5 17.4
Other 8.1 13.8 19.3
Real estate wealth Below 25th percentile 10.0 12.5 18.8
Between 25th and 50th percentile 10.3 14.4 17.1
Between 50th and 75th percentile 11.4 16.9 18.6
Between 75th and 90th percentile 14.7 22.6 23.8
Between 90th and 100th percentile 18.1 21.8 19.7
Below 20th percentile 11.1 21.1 17.5
Between 20th and 40th percentile 11.1 14.2 16.5
Between 40th and 60th percentile 10.5 15.8 15.9
Between 60th and 80th percentile 9.9 15.9 16.0
Between 80th and 100th percentile 9.7 13.1 22.2
Occupancy status
of main residence
Debt/income
(indebted households)
EMERGENCY SAVINGS (a) TABLE 2.1
SOURCES: Spanish Survey of Household Finances (EFF), Banco de España (EFF2005, EFF2008, EFF2011).
a Percentage of households af?rming emergency savings.
sector, where around 55% of the increase in bank lending to companies was concentrated 
(see Chart 2.4). The heavy fall in property sales that accompanied the crisis, along with the 
decline in property prices, meant growing difficulties for a significant portion of these 
companies in meeting meet their payment obligations. Other firms, however, used 
borrowings to finance international expansion processes which, in general, have 
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contributed to the greater geographical diversification of their revenue, helping soften the 
impact of the decline in domestic business. 
The corporate debt/GDP ratio, which stood below that of other developed countries in the 
mid-1990s (at around 45%), climbed to 132% in 2007 (117% if intercompany loans are 
excluded), far higher than the figures observed on average for the euro area (94%), the 
United Kingdom (93%) and the United States (76%) (see Chart 2.1).10 The inertia of 
financing flows and the unfavourable course of GDP meant that this ratio continued rising, 
up to almost 145% of GDP by mid-2010. Following the correction since, it stood at end-
2013 at 128% of GDP, almost 30 pp above the figure for the euro area and also higher than 
that of other advanced economies, such as the United Kingdom and the United States. 
Compared with the euro area average, corporate debt is higher in Spain in most sectors of 
activity, especially when set in relation to earnings, although the differences are more 
marked in sectors linked to the real estate market. This suggests that the need for debt to 
be corrected, while more acute in the sectors linked to the real estate market, is not 
confined to the latter. 
The breakdown by size (proxied by the volume of sales) shows that, in relation to assets, 
the debt of the biggest Spanish corporations is higher than that of their euro area peers, 
while for smaller firms the levels are similar. In terms of income generated, the ratio is 
higher in Spain for both groups of companies, even after controlling for differences in 
sectoral distribution, and the discrepancies are more marked for smaller-sized firms 
which, having been more affected by the recession, saw a greater contraction in their 
earnings. 
In any event, there is notable dispersion in the degree of debt within each sector of activity 
and for companies of different sizes. Thus, somewhat more than 15% of SMEs and almost 
7% of larger companies do not have interest-bearing debt. And among the companies that 
do, for 42% of these the leverage ratio is lower than 35%, while for 26% it exceeds 80%. 
This heterogeneity is also discernible when indicators measuring the degree of financial 
pressure associated with debt incurred are used. For instance, while 30% of companies 
(whose borrowings are equivalent to 31% of corporate liabilities) obtained revenue flows 
in 2012 that did not suffice to cover their financial expenses, almost 60% of them 
(accounting for a further 31% of corporate debt) did not have to pay interest or earmarked 
in this connection less than one-third of their ordinary profits. Therefore, these data show 
that the high aggregate debt of the non-financial corporations sector is compatible with 
the existence of a notable proportion of firms with moderate levels of debt. For these 
companies, their degree of leverage does not appear to be an obstacle to obtaining 
borrowed funds with which to finance profitable investment projects. Along these lines, 
information on micro-scale credit shows that, in 2012 and 2013, around 40% of companies 
underwent no contraction whatsoever in their outstanding credit balance. 
The evidence available since the start of the crisis reveals that the most indebted companies 
have seen their activity trend more adversely in terms of employment and investment (see 
Box 2.1). That would suggest that the sector’s high debt influences macroeconomic 
developments and highlights the need to complete the ongoing restructuring of that part 
... which affects both SMEs 
and larger companies, proving 
more prominent in certain 
sectors, such as those linked 
to the real estate market...
... although there is a 
significant proportion
of companies with moderate 
debt levels 
Companies’ debt has 
influenced their recent activity 
10  To assess the degree of debt of the corporate sector, intercompany loans should preferably not be included 
since these are liabilities of certain companies but assets of others. However, details on these loans are not 
available either for the United States or for the United Kingdom. Accordingly, in this chapter the concept of 
liabilities used to make the international comparison includes intercompany debt.
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Before the crisis, the debt of non-financial corporations increased 
very quickly. Afterwards, it has decreased slowly and progressively 
against a background characterised by a macroeconomic 
recession in which employment and productive investment have 
deteriorated notably. This Box analyses to what extent the 
employment and tangible fixed-asset investment behaviour of 
non-financial corporations differs depending on their level of debt. 
To do this, use is made of the merged CBSO and Mercantile 
Register database (CBI)1, which contains microeconomic data 
from a sample of around 600,000 firms per year, for the period 
from 2008 to 2012 (latest year available). The firms are separated 
into two groups according to whether at the beginning of each 
year their ratio of debt to net assets is above or below the average 
for their sector of activity.
Panel 1 shows the financial debt of the two groups of companies. 
It can be seen that, whereas the most indebted firms progressively 
reduced their borrowed funds from 2008, the debt of other firms 
followed an upward path until 2010 and then remained steady for 
the following two years. A more detailed analysis by sector of 
activity and firm size confirms the existence of similar behaviour 
patterns in all sectors of activity, and in both SMEs and larger 
firms. As a result of this behaviour the ratio of debt to net assets of 
both aggregates became slightly more similar (see Panel 2). This 
convergence is more evident if construction is excluded, since this 
sector’s debt ratio was pushed upward by the high losses in the 
period analysed, which reduced the denominator of this indicator.
Panels 3 and 4 show investment in tangible fixed assets (measured 
as the ratio of the flow of gross fixed capital formation to its 
balance a year earlier) and unemployment for each of the two 
groups of firms analysed (more indebted and less indebted). Both 
aggregates show declining investment and job destruction, but 
the falls are sharper for more indebted firms. This pattern is 
observed in all sectors of activity, in both SMEs and large firms.
BOX 2.1EFFECT OF INDEBTEDNESS ON EMPLOYMENT AND INVESTMENT BY NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS
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e?pense. 
1  This database is obtained by merging the CBA and CBB databases. The 
CBA database contains information on some 10,000 firms reporting 
annually to the Central Balance Sheet Data Office and is somewhat 
biased towards larger firms. The CBB database is constructed from 
financial statements lodged by firms in the mercantile registers and 
contains information on small and medium-sized enterprises.
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In short, the results reported in this Box indicate that the level of 
firms’ indebtedness influenced their investment and employment 
decisions during the crisis. In particular, more indebted firms were 
comparatively more strongly affected by the crisis, since they 
were more vulnerable to the contraction of their income. That 
obliged them to adjust their balance sheet and to reduce 
employment and investment more sharply compared with 
financially sounder firms.
BOX 2.1EFFECT OF INDEBTEDNESS ON EMPLOYMENT AND INVESTMENT BY NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS (cont’d)
of the productive system subject to a greater degree of financial pressure. The experience of 
past economic recoveries following episodes of financial crisis further points to initial 
patterns of growth which, in the case of companies, tend to be underpinned to a greater 
extent by less credit-intensive activities and financed with alternative funds, such as self-
financing or own funds. This tends to contain price adjustments insofar as the most 
indebted companies will face greater difficulties in adjusting their profit mark-ups.11
The debt ratio can be reduced either through a decline in the outstanding balance of debt 
(the numerator of this ratio) or as a result of an increase in the funds agents have to meet 
this balance (the denominator). A decline in the balance of liabilities may, in turn, occur 
because the repayments of outstanding debt exceed the flow of new gross financing (net 
negative financing flow), because the loans are unpaid or because their valuation changes 
(write-downs and valuation effects). 
Past experience reveals that debt-reduction processes following financial crises tend to be 
slow and rest, initially, on contractions in the outstanding balance of debt.12 The main 
reason is that these processes are accompanied by weak growth in income, which restricts 
agents’ spending and is a drag on economic recovery. Later, once the economy begins to 
recover, the decline in the ratio tends to be compatible with more moderate growth in debt 
than that of nominal GDP. 
The correction of private debt in the advanced economies is occurring at different degrees 
of intensity and through different channels, depending on each country’s situation. Where 
the pick-up in economic activity has come about earlier and has been greater, and where 
household debt restructuring has had a greater incidence (the United States), the reduction 
in debt has been swifter. It has also proceeded more briskly in those countries where the 
inflation rate has been higher (the United Kingdom).13
In Spain, private-sector debt/GDP ratios peaked in mid-2010. Since then there has been a 
cumulative reduction to end-2013 of 11 pp in the case of households, and of 21 pp (16 pp 
when intercompany debt is included) in that of non-financial corporations. In both, the 
reduction has essentially come about through negative net debt flows, i.e. through debt 
repayments higher than the gross flow of new financing. This factor contributed almost 
11 pp of the reduction for households and 15 pp for firms (see Chart 2.5). In this latter 
2.3  PROGRESS IN THE 
CORRECTION OF PRIVATE-
SECTOR DEBT 
Private-sector debt can be 
reduced through several 
means 
In Spain, the reduction in 
non-financial private-sector 
debt has advanced 
significantly, despite sluggish 
GDP 
11  See J. M. Montero and A. Urtasun (2014), Price-Cost Mark-ups in the Spanish Economy: a Microeconomic 
Perspective, Documentos de Trabajo, no. 1407, Banco de España.
12  See, for example, O. Aspachs-Bracons, S. Jódar-Rosell and J. Gual (2011), Perspectivas de desapalancamiento 
en España, Documentos de economía «la Caixa», and McKinsey (2012), Debt and deleveraging: uneven 
progress on the path to growth, McKinsey Global Institute.
13  See D. Garrote, J. Llopis and J. Vallés (2013), Los canales del desapalancamiento del sector privado: una 
comparación internacional, Documentos Ocasionales, no. 1302, Banco de España.
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case, the write-downs and valuation effects, including the impact of the transfer of real 
estate loans to Sareb, have also played a significant role (8 pp). Conversely, inflation has 
made a marginal contribution and real growth, which has been negative, has exerted a 
counter-effect (increase in the debt ratio). The reduction in overall Spanish corporate and 
household debt has been greater than that recorded in economies such as the United 
States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, which also faced private-sector over-
indebtedness problems. However, the level of the Spanish ratio continues to stand above 
that of these countries.
In the household sector, the contraction in debt has been quantitatively more significant in 
loans not linked to house purchase, which reflects both the shorter relative term of these 
transactions (which makes their repayment swifter) and the lack of collateral in this type of 
loan, thereby raising the risk for lenders (leading supply-side conditions to be more 
cyclically sensitive). Indeed, in this type of financing the reduction in the outstanding 
balance began in 2008, before it did so in the case of real estate debt. Moreover, this 
reduction was the result both of the proportion of indebted households and of average 
loan amounts (see Chart 2.2). Conversely, in loans for house purchase the proportion of 
indebted households stabilised between 2006 and 2010, and fell very slowly only from 
2011, while the average amount of debt has fallen somewhat more sharply since this latter 
date. Part of the decline in the outstanding balance of debt for property purchases is 
linked to the cancellation of loans associated with the hand-over of houses when borrowers 
are in situations of financial difficulty. Specifically, during 2012 and 2013, such transactions 
accounted for 1.4% of outstanding mortgages. 
In the case of companies, the decline in debt has been fairly widespread across sectors 
and has affected both large corporations and, especially, SMEs; that said, the reduction is 
most concentrated in the most indebted companies, which are those that have greater 
balance-sheet restructuring requirements.14 On the contrary, those other companies with 
little debt have, on average, increased their debt. Companies that have reduced their 
borrowings have used different means to do so, such as the use of internally generated 
funds, capital increases or asset (essentially financial assets and, in particular, shares and 
The decline in household debt 
has been sharper in loans not 
intended for house purchase
Companies have used 
different means to reduce their 
debt, and those that have 
done so most intensely are the 
most indebted ones 
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14  See Á. Menéndez and M. Méndez (2013), “Spanish non-financial corporations’ debt since the start of the crisis. 
A disaggregated analysis”, Economic Bulletin, January, Banco de España.
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holdings in other companies) disposals. Some of the biggest corporations have resorted 
especially to asset disposals.15
Spain is a heavily banked economy, meaning that the bulk of financing raised by households 
and non-financial corporations is from the national banking system. Consequently, the 
counterpart of the strong growth in household and corporate debt in the years prior to the 
crisis was the expansion of resident credit institutions’ balance sheets and activity. From 
1995 to 2007 their total assets increased by 286%, the number of offices did so by 25% 
and employment in the industry by 12%. In 2008, the lending/GDP ratio stood at around 
170%, far higher than in other developed countries (105% in the euro area, 132% in the 
United Kingdom and 64% in the United States). As earlier discussed, the expansion was 
accompanied by a progressive concentration in transactions linked to the real estate 
market. 
Given the insufficiency of domestic saving to finance this expansion in lending, banks 
resorted to international debt markets. Most funds were raised through the issuance of 
long-term fixed-income securities, directly by the banks themselves (as in the case of 
covered bonds, for instance) or through special vehicles (as in the case of asset-backed 
bonds). As a result, non-residents’ holdings of fixed-income instruments issued by 
domestic financial institutions climbed from 0.4% of GDP in 1995 to 62.5% of GDP in 
2007, against the generalised background of the internationalisation of financial flows, and 
driven also by Spanish euro area entry. 
The excessive size of the banking system, along with the bias of its portfolios towards 
real estate sector-related activities, made it vulnerable to adverse macroeconomic 
shocks, and in particular to those linked to the real estate market. In these circumstances, 
the economic crisis that broke in 2008 ultimately undermined the financial and balance-
sheet position of the banking system, albeit with a very mixed degree of incidence from 
bank to bank.
As a result, it was necessary to overhaul the banking system by means of a four-pronged 
reform: restructuring, recapitalisation, balance sheet clean-up and the reform of the 
regulatory and supervisory framework.16 These measures are analysed in Chapter 1 of this 
Report, as they are one of the most significant factors behind developments in the Spanish 
economy during the reference period. 
The banking system clean-up and restructuring measures required public injections of 
capital. The necessary resources were obtained, in part, from a specific European support 
programme totalling €41 billion, which was requested in July 2012 and successfully 
concluded in early 2014. The financing of these capital injections came on top of growing 
general government financial requirements in the wake of the crisis, linked essentially to 
the operation of the automatic stabilisers and to the expansionary discretionary measures 
adopted (see Chart 2.6). The assistance and stimuli to the private sector, set against the 
strong decline in tax receipts, translated into growing budget deficits and into a rapid 
increase in public debt. It was through all these measures that the link between both 
sectors progressively increased, in such a way that a portion of the private-sector 
adjustment costs ultimately passed through to the public sector. 
3  The nation’s debt 
3.1  THE ROLE OF THE BANKING 
SYSTEM
The banking system financed 
the increase in private-sector 
debt by raising funds on 
international markets...
... meaning that the banking 
system’s situation was much 
affected by the crisis...
... which made it necessary
to undertake a major 
restructuring, recapitalisation 
and clean-up of the banking 
system, along with regulatory 
reform
3.2  THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC 
SECTOR 
State aid for the restructuring 
of the banking system came 
on top of growing general 
government financing 
requirements 
15  For further details on the means used by large corporate groups to reduce their debt, see Box 1 in Á. Menéndez 
and M. Méndez (2013), “Results of non-financial corporations to 2012 Q4 and summary year-end data”, 
Economic Bulletin, March, Banco de España.
16  See Chapter 3 of the Financial Stability Report, November 2012, Banco de España.
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Most of the increase in public debt had to be financed through resort to the rest of the 
world and to the banking system itself, through which 31% and 47%, respectively, of new 
funds were raised. As a result, there was a rise not only in the Spanish economy’s external 
debt but also a sizable increase in banks’ exposure to the public sector. 
The heightened bank exposure to general government and the assumption by the latter of 
a most sizeable portion of the restructuring bill for certain financial institutions contributed 
to increasing the interrelatedness between the financial position of the banking system 
and that of the public sector. The combination of both situations with the worsening 
macroeconomic outlook shaped the three sides of a triangle of negative interactions. 
These were particularly acute at the height of the tension on financial markets during the 
European debt crisis and they ultimately highlighted the difficulty of maintaining a single 
currency in the presence of highly integrated financial markets if, at the same time, 
supervisory and banking resolution policies remained in the hands of the national 
authorities.17 The weakness of expected economic growth dented banks’ earnings 
expectations. This adversely impacted their financing costs, and the pass-through of 
The link between the banking 
system and the public sector 
gave rise to a risk feedback 
loop between both that has 
hampered resolution of the 
debt crisis 
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17  For empirical evidence on these negative interactions between the banking and public sectors, see V. V. 
Acharya, I. Drechsler and Ph. Schnabl (2012), “Tale of two overhangs: the nexus of financial sector and 
sovereign credit risks”, and R. Breton, C. Pinto and P.-F. Weber (2012), “Banks, moral hazard, and public debts”, 
in Banque de France (2012), Public debt, monetary policy and financial stability. Financial Stability Review, April. 
The European crisis, in general, and the nature of the links between the financial fragility of the banking system 
and of the public sector, in particular, were addressed more fully in Chapter 2 of the Annual Report, 2012.
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these greater costs to the price of credit detracted from the possibility of higher growth. 
Further, it negatively affected the projections of public finances through the attendant 
impact on the automatic stabilisers and also as a result of the perceived greater risk of a 
potential public intervention in the financial system, which had been fuelled by the above-
mentioned effects on bank profitability. The subsequent expected difficulties in general 
government being able to exert a stabilising effect fed through, in turn, to expectations of 
excessively weak growth.
The debt of the various domestic economic agents and their interrelatedness are reflected 
in the nation’s overall financial position vis-à-vis the external sector. Thus, the build-up of 
debt by the private sector during the pre-crisis expansionary phase, which outpaced the 
public sector’s saving capacity, translated into successive deficits on the current and 
capital accounts. And owing to these deficits and to the trend of the relative prices of our 
assets and liabilities vis-à-vis the rest of the world18, the net external liabilities of resident 
agents as a whole increased substantially (as a percentage of GDP) from the mid-1990s to 
the onset of the global financial crisis in 2007 (see Chart 2.7). They carried on rising 
thereafter, albeit at a lesser pace, in a setting in which the economy continued to evidence 
net borrowing requirements, albeit increasingly smaller ones, until posting net lending 
capacity in 2013. Gross liabilities increased to a greater extent, since this growth was 
accompanied by the greater internationalisation of the Spanish economy, reflected in a 
growth of its claims on the rest of the world. 
The course of liabilities was essentially determined by the behaviour of external debt, 
which includes only liabilities that entail payment obligations, as opposed to others, such 
as investment in equity instruments, which do not give rise to such commitments. 
Considering gross external debt (160% of GDP in December 2013) exclusively, the Spanish 
economy’s current position is not significantly different from that of nations such as 
Germany, and this debt proportion is even lower than that of France and the United 
Kingdom. However, given that these countries have a greater volume of claims on the rest 
of the world, Spain’s international investment position in net terms shows high figures 
(98% of GDP), exceeded only by Portugal, Ireland and Greece among the euro area 
countries and far above the 35% threshold set by the European Commission as a 
benchmark for identifying macroeconomic imbalances under the new EU surveillance 
procedure. 
The sustainability of the external financial position depends ultimately on the ability to 
meet the periodic payments associated therewith, their repayment at maturity and, also, 
potential withdrawals of funds by foreign investors or the non-rollover of the operations 
which, at the time of maturing, need to be rolled over. Accordingly, what is important is not 
only the volume of foreign liabilities, but also their composition in terms of maturities and 
instruments. 
Direct investment and investment in listed shares entail, from this perspective, a lower risk 
given the generally more durable nature of the former and the lesser callability of the latter. 
Under other investment (portfolio investment and other investment), their callability varies 
with the maturity of the instruments. Lastly, euro area membership generates asset- and 
liabilities-side positions among the participating central banks (intra-system claims) that do 
3.3  EXTERNAL DEBT 
As a result of the changes
in the financial position of the 
different sectors and of their 
interrelatedness, the nation’s 
debt increased strongly 
The risks associated with a 
specific position against the 
rest of the world depend on 
the magnitude involved and 
on the composition of 
liabilities 
18  According to estimates based on information from the Spanish balance of payments and international 
investment position, the valuation effects (along with other adjustments) account for somewhat more than half 
of the increase in net external liabilities from 1995 to 2007. 
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not have a specific maturity and which are not, therefore, callable in the strict sense. 
However, the level is informative since a high net debtor position in these assets corresponds 
to greater dependence by resident credit institutions on financing from the Eurosystem.19
The bulk of foreign liabilities corresponds to non-residents’ portfolio investments in long-
term instruments (issued mainly by financial institutions). Close to 80% of short-term 
investments, which entail higher refinancing risks, correspond to Spanish credit institutions’ 
liabilities. In turn, a sizeable portion of the latter are interbank loans, of which one-third are 
collateralised. Furthermore, 58% of those that are not collateralised correspond to foreign 
banks. Both factors significantly reduce the risks of their potential non-rollover. Taking 
available interbank claims on the external sector also into account, the net non-
collateralised debtor position of domestic banks was practically zero at end-2013. 
In the remaining sectors, claimable foreign liabilities are essentially long-term instruments. 
Moreover, as indicated for credit institutions, these sectors also have claims on the foreign 
sector which, though they have fallen in recent years, and even bearing in mind the fact 
that the private agents holding these assets do not exactly match the borrowers, they still 
provide for something of a buffer to withstand possible fund withdrawals. 
Although refinancing risks are contained, maintaining a high net debtor position vis-à-vis 
the external sector is a factor of vulnerability for the Spanish economy, due both to the 
draining off of resources entailed by the payments associated with this debt and, above 
all, to the exposure to potential bouts of instability. 
The swollen debt of Spanish households, firms and general government sectors conditions 
their capacity to undertake new spending and hiring decisions. At the same time, the 
aggregation of this debt translates into a high debtor position of the whole of the economy 
vis-à-vis the rest of the world, which makes it vulnerable to potential shocks that alter the 
normal functioning of international financial markets or that affect foreign investors’ 
confidence in our economy. Accordingly, reducing these debt ratios to more comfortable 
levels is a vital condition for setting in place a stable growth path. 
The redressing of private-sector debt began some time back, but the singular 
macroeconomic conditions prevailing restrict the speed of its progress. First, the 
momentum behind economic growth that is needed to reduce the weight of the debt rests 
largely on the continuous attainments of gains in competitiveness, which requires 
maintaining price restraint that ensures the favourable behaviour of the inflation differentials 
in relation to the euro area average. The low levels of inflation in the euro area at present 
and the projections on its future behaviour show that the easing in debt ratios that an 
increase in the level of prices may provide will continue to be fairly limited. Also, the 
foreseeable path of recovery of the economy suggests moderate real growth rates, whose 
contribution to reducing the debt ratios will likewise be modest. 
Despite the progress achieved in fiscal consolidation, the decline in public debt has not yet 
begun. On the forecasts available, the fiscal adjustment still needed to stabilise the public 
debt/GDP ratio remains considerable. In particular, according to the latest Stability 
Programme update, keeping the public debt/GDP ratio below the 100% threshold in 2017 
Although the bulk of external 
financing corresponds to long-
term portfolio investment and 
refinancing risks in the short 
term are limited...
... maintaining such a high net 
debtor position is a major 
factor of vulnerability 
4  The reduction of debt: 
conditioning factors 
and challenges 
The economy’s high level of 
debt conditions growth and is 
a major factor of vulnerability, 
meaning its reduction is 
unavoidable 
The adjustment has begun, 
but it is gradual and must be 
completed under demanding 
conditions 
High public debt makes 
continuing fiscal consolidation 
vital 
19  See the note “Banco de España claims on the Eurosystem in the Balance of Payments” (http://www.bde.es/
webbde/en/estadis/bpagos).
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would require a cumulative 6.4 pp reduction, in terms of GDP, in the primary deficit. It 
should be borne in mind that the fiscal consolidation that enabled public debt to stabilise 
at 70% of GDP in the first half of the 1990s involved a reduction in the primary deficit for 
the period as a whole of 3.6 pp.20 
These considerations underscore the significance of fiscal consolidation for firstly 
stabilising and subsequently reducing the public debt ratio. That would lessen the 
vulnerability of our economy to potential adverse shocks, while contributing to reducing 
the cost of financing for the other sectors in the economy, providing for a reduction in 
private debt. 
Under these conditions, supply-side policies are the best option for squaring the adjustment 
of private and public debt with sustained economic growth. The habitual objection to 
these types of reforms in recessions is that they may, in the short run, cause reductions in 
agents’ incomes that translate into an increase in private debt ratios and in their associated 
burdens. However, if there are constraints on the capacity to incur debt, as is the case at 
present, structural reforms that improve the workings of the product and labour markets 
may – practically immediately – stimulate employment and aggregate demand, raising by 
extension economic agents’ incomes (see Box 1.2). Moreover, the positive effects of these 
reforms on productivity result in gains in competitiveness which, along with those prompted 
by the adjustment of labour costs, contribute to stimulating economic growth and to 
reducing external debt. 
Given the non-contingent nature of traditional debt agreements, the cost they entail for 
debtors does not adjust to changes in their financial position or adverse shocks that affect 
their revenue flows. Nonetheless, it is in the interest of creditors to avoid debtor insolvency 
when such adverse shocks arise. Thus, under certain conditions, agreements that smooth 
debt service through the orderly amendment – in clearly defined cases – of certain contractual 
terms may be favourable to both parties. The challenge consists of legally designing 
procedures that avert the problems of moral hazard and do not jeopardise the solvency of 
creditors, as the latter are also vulnerable to default in a financial crisis situation.21
The legal framework for insolvency proceedings was regulated in Spain in 2003, but it has 
since been the subject of intense reform, including most recently Royal Decree-Law 
4/2014. This process has essentially been aimed at setting in place more flexible and 
orderly mechanisms that facilitate the survival of companies that are under pressure in the 
short run but are viable in the medium and long term (see Box 2.2). 
In the case of households, the types of loans involved – mortgage loans in the main, with a 
single lender – mean that the mechanisms for the private restructuring of the debt are less 
complex. In December 2013 (the latest available figure), refinancing and restructuring 
operations affected 10% of house mortgage loans. Additionally, shorter-dated financial 
pressure problems are more limited since they affect a smaller proportion of borrowers 
compared with what occurs with non-financial corporations and because, on the latest EFF 
data, there has been a decline in this proportion in recent years (see the upper left-hand panel 
of Chart 2.3), largely linked to the fall in interest rates prompted by a very expansionary 
monetary policy. 
Under these conditions, 
structural reform policies
are the most evident option 
available to square the need
to correct the economy’s debt 
with economic growth...
... accompanied by 
mechanisms that help provide 
for the survival of viable 
companies with financial 
problems ...
20  See P. Hernández de Cos and J. F. Jimeno (2013), Fiscal policy and external imbalances in a debt crisis: the 
Spanish case, Documentos Ocasionales, no. 1303, Banco de España.
21  See A. Mian, A. Sufi and F. Trebbi (2012), Resolving Debt Overhang: Political Constraints in the Aftermath of 
Financial Crisis, NBER working paper 17831.
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Corporate insolvency proceedings are a legal proceeding which 
aims to address the situation of a borrower’s insolvency either 
through an agreement (accord) between the creditors and the 
debtor firm or through the winding-up of the latter. In the first case, 
a reduction in the nominal value of the debt is agreed (partial 
acquittance) and/or in the schedule of payments (payment period). 
In the second case, the creditors are paid by selling the company’s 
assets in accordance with the legally stipulated order of priority of 
creditors. These proceedings exist in all developed countries and 
most emerging economies. In Spain, they are currently governed 
by the Insolvency Law,1 which was approved in 2003 and came 
into force on 1 September 2004. The economic crisis underlined 
some of the shortfalls in the Law and, consequently, it has been 
subject to four major reforms through Royal Decree-Law 3/20092, 
Law 38/20113, the Entrepreneurs’ Law4 and Royal Decree-Law 
4/20145.
The main function of insolvency proceedings is to overcome 
problems of coordination and asymmetric information which make 
it difficult to renegotiate debt privately and for debts to be 
recovered individually and may lead to suboptimal results for 
lenders and borrowers. Coordination problems arise where there 
is a high number of creditors with diverging interests, whereas the 
asymmetric information problems are particularly important in the 
case of small creditors, with little information and a short 
commercial relationship with the debtor, and in the case of small 
borrowers. Individual recoveries of the debts of a firm whose 
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c Year 2013. Source: Doing Business (World Bank).
d Year 2010. Sources: Eurostat, OECD, national sources and Euler Hermes (2011); "Economic Outlook 2011",  No. 4, Business Insolvency Worldwide, Evreux. 
1  This proceeding may also be used by individuals without a business 
activity (consumers), although this box focuses on firms.
2  Royal Decree-Law 3/2009 of 27 March 2009 on urgent tax, financial and 
insolvency measures in the face of economic developments.
3  Law 38/2011 of 10 October 2011 reforming Insolvency Law 22/2003 of 
9 July 2003.
4  Law 14/2013 of 27 September 2013 to support entrepreneurs and their 
internationalisation.
5  Royal Decree-Law 4/2014 of 7 March 2014, adopting urgent measures 
on corporate debt refinancing and restructuring.
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assets do not cover its liabilities usually result in a creditors’ race 
for the available funds. This may lead to the dismantling of a firm 
which is solvent but has liquidity problems and to losses for all 
creditors.
Insolvency proceedings in Spain attempt to overcome these 
problems through several arrangements. Generally, the beginning 
of the insolvency proceedings halts all enforcement proceedings 
against the firm. Additionally, a list is drawn up of all the company’s 
assets and the claims against it, so that all creditors have the same 
information about the company’s net worth position. Finally, for a 
creditors’ agreement to be approved the favourable vote of 
ordinary creditors representing at least 50% of the firm’s liabilities, 
which are not collateralised, is required.
However, in practice, several factors have prevented insolvency 
proceedings in Spain from carrying out their function satisfactorily. 
First, they last a very long time compared with similar proceedings 
in other developed countries, except for Italy, and their duration 
has increased significantly since the beginning of the crisis (see 
Panel 1). Second, a very high proportion of firms which are subject 
to insolvency proceedings (95%) are ultimately wound up. Since it 
is unlikely that practically all the firms entering insolvency 
proceedings are non-viable, the system would seem to be 
incapable of restructuring the debt of solvent companies with 
liquidity problems. As for other developed countries, only Italy has 
a similar percentage, whereas the figures for France, the United 
Kingdom and the United States are substantially lower (see Panel 
2). Finally, as shown by Panel 3, insolvency proceedings in Spain 
have high direct costs which consume a large share of the firm’s 
assets. These costs are higher than in the United Kingdom, the 
United States, Germany and France, and only lower than those in 
Italy. These factors contribute to insolvency proceedings being 
used much less in Spain by firms under financial pressure than in 
most developed countries as shown by the insolvency rates (the 
number of companies commencing insolvency proceedings 
divided by those leaving the market), shown in Panel 4.
The need to have rapid and flexible proceedings in place is 
particularly important in the case of large and medium-sized firms 
where coordination problems can reduce the success of private 
negotiations owing to the large number of creditors involved. By 
contrast, private restructurings are more likely to work at small 
companies in view of the small number of lenders (35% of Spanish 
SMEs with bank debt use only one bank and 60% use one or two 
banks)6.
The reforms of the Insolvency Law implemented recently by the 
Entrepreneurs’ Law and Royal Decree-Law 4/2014, develop the 
alternatives to insolvency proceedings. The former creates a specific 
procedure – the out-of-court agreement for payment – for the self-
employed and small businesses, which habitually used insolvency 
proceedings least due to their high fixed costs. The latter introduces 
changes into how pre-insolvency refinancing works to make it more 
appealing and effective so that firms can restructure their debt more 
flexibly without having to apply for insolvency proceedings.
More specifically, Royal Decree-Law 4/2014 simplifies the 
proceedings required for undertaking such operations and for 
halting individual debt enforcement proceedings while negotiations 
take place. It extends the list of conditions of these agreements 
which can be imposed on dissident creditors. Thus, in addition to 
partial acquittances, provision is also made for the possibility of 
reductions in the payment period, the conversion of debt into 
equity, and the transfer in payment of debt of the assets or claims 
of the company in difficulties. The mere capitalisation of debt by 
creditors does not make them persons specially related to the 
insolvent legal person. Consequently, they avoid the detrimental 
treatment (subordination of their loans) generally received by the 
claims of shareholders or partners of a firm subject to insolvency 
proceedings. The Royal Decree-Law also stipulates that temporarily 
during a period of two years from the entry into force of the law, any 
fresh financing (previously 50%) which has been extended in the 
framework of a refinancing agreement will be considered 
preferential credit, thus giving it a higher priority in the ranking of 
claims. Insofar as the agreements reached respond to a feasible 
plan permitting the continuity of the firm, the liabilities arising from 
the negotiations will, logically, have a lower risk of default. In the 
particular case of bank creditors, restructured debts, providing that 
they comply with the strict criteria established, would be classified 
as standard exposure, as was clarified by the Banco de España’s 
communication to banks in March 2014. This would reduce the 
need to record provisions for them and would thus increase the 
capacity of banks to meet new solvent demand for lending.
BOX 2.2CORPORATE DEBT RESTRUCTURING AND INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS (cont’d)
6  Source: Central Credit Register, May 2013.
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So that the reduction in debt should not hamper economic growth, it is also important that 
the containment of lending at the aggregate scale – which is vital for reducing debt ratios – 
should be compatible with the availability of financing for more solvent agents with 
profitable investment projects. 
The evidence available suggests that, in the case of corporations, this type of reallocation 
of credit among companies might already be taking place. Hence, over the past two years, 
despite the aggregate contraction in corporate debt, around 40% of Spanish firms with 
debt have increased or maintained the outstanding balance of their bank borrowings. 
These companies are characterised by having a sounder financial position than those 
whose debt has contracted (higher profitability and a lower degree of debt and interest 
burden) and by showing more dynamic activity (high growth in sales and in employment). 
To boost this pattern of healthy credit reallocation among companies, it is important to 
smooth the frictions bearing down on credit supply. These frictions arise, in part, from the 
financial fragmentation in Europe that is preventing monetary impulses from being passed 
through in full to all the euro area countries. In this respect, the successful conclusion of 
banking union in Europe is pivotal to achieving greater financial market integration in the 
area. Another strand of the frictions, however, relates to the asymmetric information 
problems that hamper SMEs’ access to financing. The public assistance schemes for this 
type of company and the measures aimed at improving the quality of credit information are 
examples of measures that can contribute to mitigating these problems.22
Past experience shows that recovery following episodes of crisis with a strong financial 
component tends to be slow. In the current setting, part of this slowness is due to the 
difficulties involved in correcting financial imbalances when real and nominal growth in the 
economy is low. 
Despite these difficulties, adjustments in the financial positions of the various institutional 
sectors of the Spanish economy are not only unavoidable; indeed, the speed at which they 
ultimately come about will influence the pace and scope of the economic recovery under 
way. If corporations, households and general government maintain an excessive level of 
debt, investment and consumption will not prove dynamic enough to recoup the losses in 
output and employment caused by the crisis and to place the economy on a stable growth 
path.
... and measures aimed
at correcting frictions in the 
credit market that hamper
the channeling of new flows
to their most efficient uses
The speed of the adjustments 
will influence the pace
and scope of the recovery
22  See J. Ayuso (2013), “An analysis of the situation of lending in Spain”, Economic Bulletin, October, Banco de 
España.
